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Abstract: In practice, risk and uncertainty are essentially unavoidable in many regulation
processes. Regulators frequently face a risk-benefit trade-off since zero risk is neither
practicable nor affordable. Although it is accepted that cost-benefit analysis is important
in many scenarios of risk management, what role it should play in a decision process is
still controversial. One criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that decision makers should
consider marginal benefits and costs, not present ones, in their decision making. In this
paper, we investigate the problem of regulatory decision making under risk by applying
expected utility theory and present a new approach of cost-benefit analysis. Directly
taking into consideration the reduction of the risks, this approach achieves marginal cost-
benefit analysis. By applying this approach, the optimal regulatory decision that
maximizes the marginal benefit of risk reduction can be considered. This provides a
transparent and reasonable criterion for stakeholders involved in the regulatory activity.
An example of evaluating seismic retrofitting alternatives is provided to demonstrate the
potential of the proposed approach.
2Key words: Regulatory decision making, cost-benefit analysis, ALARP, expected utility
theory
1 INTRODUCTION
One long-standing theme within regulatory risk management is evaluating the cost-
benefit of managing risk. Assuming a risk warrants active management, what is a
reasonable spend on risk management; when does this spend become disproportionate to
the benefits that a managed risk brings and how far should investment in risk
management continue, if at all, beyond the point whereby the risk is deemed
insignificant? In essence, this is an optimisation problem inherently bound up with the
law of diminishing returns, in that continued investment in risk management results in
ever-decreasing incremental reductions in risk of lesser incremental value. Wise risk
managers understand that the principal benefits of risk reduction are likely to be secured
by targeting resources at a relatively few features of a problem, and that this action will
be optimised when the risk is reduced to that which is as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP) or achievable (ALARA). Thereafter, increased investment may become
disproportionate to the benefits gained. ALARP and ALARA are well-researched
concepts within health and safety legislation, radiation protection and to a limited extent
within environmental protection. ALARP has been controversial and subject to several
court rulings; especially with respect to what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
investment by a regulated party, and thus the concept of gross disproportionality (of
investment in risk management compared to the risk reduction benefits gained). A
3familiar regulatory discussion involves the regulator and regulated party exchanging
views on (i) the initial significance of a risk, thus triggering a risk management action
where the risk is deemed significant; followed by (ii) an enthusiastic debate on the
practicalities and costs of risk management (often requiring additional investment), which
may secures agreement over the residual risk level and degree of investment. What
guidance can researchers bring to these debates?
Fig.1 illustrates the framework the HSE (Health and Safety Executive, UK) has
adopted in its regulation process [1]. The inverted triangle represents an increasing level
of risk for a particular hazardous activity as we move from the bottom of the triangle
towards the top. The regulators’ objective is twofold. Firstly to ensure that the risks do
not exceed an unacceptable level, and secondly to ensure that risk management measures
put in place to reduce risk are proportionate to the risk. Practically, the degree of risk
often falls in the ALARP region, so that benefits are achieved while being prepared to
tolerate the risks from the activities. This framework provides a reasonable description of
regulatory decision making under risk. However, suppose there are several feasible
solutions to an environmental problem, each of which leads to a degree of residual risk
that falls into the ALARP region, for example. How the regulator should choose among
these alternatives?
This is the field of options appraisal for risk reduction, of which an economic
component is only one aspect. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was originally used to
evaluate the desirability of governmental intervention in markets, and has now been used
in many areas of public decision making. Typical fields of application include
transportation [2, 3], health care [4, 5], environment [6-10], and safety [11, 12]. The
4essential foundations of cost-benefit analysis are: benefits and costs are narrowly defined
as monetary values, and an activity is worthwhile only if its benefits exceed its costs. A
benefit-cost ratio which is the ratio of total benefits relative to total costs is commonly
used as one of the criteria in regulatory decision making. Some important issues on CBA
have been widely investigated, for example, uncertainty [13, 14], discounting rates [15-
17], and equity [18].
Most researchers agree that benefit-cost ratios are neither necessary nor sufficient for
the regulatory decisions, partially because economic factors are usually not the most
important, and partially because not all important factors for decision making can be
quantified [19, 18]. In some areas, the regulation of nuclear waste disposal for example,
the optimisation of risk reduction in the ALARP region has received considerable
attention.
One criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that decision makers should consider
marginal benefits, not present ones, in decision making. Marginal benefit is the increase
of total benefit as a result of an extra investment in risk reduction. This concept grew out
of attempts by economists to explain the determination of price [20, 21]. It is often
assumed in economics that as the amount of any one input is increased, holding all other
inputs constant, the amount that output increases for each additional unit of the expanding
input will generally decrease. This law of diminishing marginal utility implies that there
exists an optimal amount of input such that the efficiency of the investment is
maximized. The objective of marginal analysis then, is to find out the optimal solution
among those alternatives of investment. Within the context of risk regulation, marginal
benefit represents the marginal effect of risk reduction, mathematically the first derivative
5of the total benefit with respect to the amount of investment, from a range of alternatives.
In most scenarios of risk regulation, the possibilities of disaster (risk) can only be reduced
to some values above zero and further reduction will be unaffordable. Therefore,
marginal analysis can contribute to the optimisation of risk reduction in the ALARP
region. We have not found any application of marginal analysis in CBA. The reason
might lie in the difficulty of connecting a reduction of risk with monetary values of
benefit and cost, especially in the fields of health and safety and environmental
legislation where externalities are prominent. Below, we propose an approach that
maximizes the marginal benefit of risk reduction by estimating the first order condition of
expected utility. With this approach, different alternatives can be compared according to
their efficiencies in reducing risk with least monetary expenditure.
This approach could be a supplement to the framework of ALARP and quantified risk
assessment. Applying ALARP requires a comparison of different credible risk reduction
strategies in order to demonstrate at what level the risks are optimised. It is difficult to
achieve it because we lack criteria on how efficient the risks could be reduced for each
risk management option [22, 23]. This approach is especially suitable for the comparisons
of different risk reduction methods.
2 AN EXPECTED UTILITY APPROACH OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
Expected utility theory has long been an approach to deal with the problem of decision
making under risk and uncertainty in economics. The axiomatic hypothesis of expected
utility is that the decision maker can make a possibility distribution over possible
6outcomes of activities. When applying expected utility theory to regulatory decision
making, we need to assume that the regulator has a utility function (or preference) over
public wealth. This assumption is reasonable because the objective of the regulators is to
regulate specific activities on behalf of the public. Notice that this assumption is different
from the general assumption in economics that the utility function of an agent is the
evaluation of his/her own wealth. In economics, individual decision makers are assumed
to be self-interested. This assumption is not suitable for the case of regulatory decision
making because public welfare is a primary objective. Assuming that the regulator only
cares for his/her own benefit in regulation is equivalent to assuming that no regulator can
be component.
Suppose an activity may lead to several possible outcomes and each outcome can be
expressed as a monetary value. Assume the decision maker has a complete, reflexive,
transitive, and continuous evaluation over these monetary outcomes, or in other words,
he/she possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Let x be an outcome and
let X be the set of possible outcomes. Let p be a simple probability measure on X, thus
))(,),(),(( 21 nxpxpxpp  where )( ixp are probabilities of outcome Xxi 
( ni ,,1 ) occurring. Note that there are finite elements Xx for which )(xp 0 , and
that )( ixp 0 for all ni ,,1 and 1)(1  
n
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xp . The expected utility over the set of
outcomes X is expressed as,
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n
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xpxuXU   (1)
where )(u is the von Neumann Morgenstern utility function.
7Let h be a binary relation over U so that YX h  )()( YUXU  , which means
that X is preferred to, or equivalent to, Y if and only if )()( YUXU  . Similarly, we have
YX h  )()( YUXU  and X~Y  )()( YUXU  . In this way, individuals can
build a set of preferences over several alternatives.
Consider a scenario of regulatory decision making under risk (disposal of nuclear
wastes, for example) where the risk is the possible realisation of environmental hazard.
Suppose that the hazard may lead to a loss of wealth Nw Aw (measured by a monetary
value), where Nw denotes the original wealth and Aw the reduced wealth if the hazard
has occurred. In order to keep the risk within the acceptable range, an amount of money
C is going to be invested. The objective of regulatory decision making is to find the
optimal amount of investment that maximizes the public good.
Let  denote the possibility (or risk) of the occurrence of an accident. We assume the
existence of a state-independent utility function of the regulator )(wu defined over
payoffs, thus:
),( CU  )( Cwu A  )()1( Cwu N   (2)
Notice that ),( CU  represents the expected utility of the regulator over public wealth
and that  is a function of C in the above equation.
The regulator’s objective is to find the optimal amount of expenditure given Aw and
Nw . Thus the optimization problem is:
max ),( CU  )( Cwu A  )()1( Cwu N  
which yields the first order condition:
0)()1()()()(),(  CwuCwuCwuCwuCCU NNAA 
8or, rearranging:
)()1()())()(( CwuCwuCwuCwu NAAN   (3)
Let’s first consider the case that the regulator is risk-neutral, that is, the utility
function )(wu is linear over w . )(wu is then a constant and, without loss of generality,
suppose that kwu  )( . Notice that there are  )( Cwu A kCwu N  )( and
 )( Cwu N )( Cwu A  )( AN wwk  , we have (4) directly from (3).
)(1 AN ww  (4)
Equation (4) gives the condition of optimal expenditure against risk. Fig.2 shows how
the optimal expenditure optC can be computed. The X-Y axes as shown in Fig.2 denote
the expenditure C and the possibility of risk  respectively. The line F which satisfies
(4) intersects the curve )(C at a point A . Point A denotes the optimal solution of
benefit-expenditure tradeoff that maximizes the expected utility. The expenditure is optC
when the risk is reduced to the level of Opt , which means that the ratio of marginal
reduction of the risk to the expenditure is maximized, or in other words, the risk is
reduced to the degree so that a further reduction needs much more expenditure and is
therefore not economical.
The optimal expenditure Opt depends crucially on the assumption of linearity
property of the utility function. Suppose, however, the regulator is not risk-neutral,
optimal expenditure will deviate from Opt . When the regulator is risk-averse, he would
rather invest more money to reduce the risk involved, and there should be
)(1 An ww  (5)
9Consider the line G (as shown in Fig.2) that satisfies (5), for example, a risk-averse
agent’s decision may be point B , with which the expenditure increases ( OptB CC  ) and
the possibility of an accident decreases ( OptB   ) compared to the risk-neutral case. The
more risk-averse an agent is, the more expenditure he/she would like to invest in order to
reduce the risk.
If the agent is risk-prone, on the other hand, he would prefer an alternative with less
expenditure and higher risk to the alternative with Opt and OptC .
This benefit-expenditure analysis is not sufficient for a regulator to make their final
decision because it provides only one of the criteria that should be taken into
consideration. Notice that the alternative with OptC is optimal only if Opt is an
acceptable value of risk (as shown in Fig. 3(a)). If an alternative may cause an intolerable
level of risk, it is unacceptable no matter how much benefit it will create.
Arrow and Lind [24] have indicated that a regulator should behave in a risk- neutral
fashion. Under the assumption of risk-neutral, the regulatory decisions could be
transparent and consistent among the stakeholders.
3 AN EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION
The city of Istanbul, Turkey is within an area with the possibility that strong earthquakes
will occur in the near future due to the underlying geography. Since 1999 earthquakes
near Istanbul have caused more than 18,000 deaths. As a consequence, there has been
increasing awareness of trying to reduce the risk of loss (especially loss of human life)
when a damaging earthquake happens.
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Smyth et al. [25, 26] introduced a cost-benefit analysis of seismic retrofitting
measures of a representative apartment building in Istanbul, in which three alternative
options of retrofitting the building were given in order to reinforce its structure. These
alternatives denote three levels of retrofit: braced, partial shear wall, and full shear wall
solutions. The probabilities of the building collapse and mitigation cost for these retrofit
options together with the option of no retrofit are listed in Table 1.
The loss in damaging earthquakes is determined by evaluating the expected damage
to the property and the reduction in fatalities from earthquakes. The direct economic loss
due to building damage or collapse is estimated to be $250,000. Let LN and V denote
the expected number of fatalities and the expected cost of a human life respectively. The
cost of fatalities can then be expressed as LN V .
We now apply the proposed approach to this issue in order to evaluate and compare
mitigation alternatives. The objective of choosing between different alternatives is to
prevent the building from collapsing in earthquakes so as to reduce the expected number
of fatalities. It should be pointed out that the objective of this example is to demonstrate
the usage and potential of the proposed approach, rather than to focus on determining
precise values of this specific instance. Instead of evaluating the expected number of
fatalities and cost of human lives, LN and V , we consider the cases of different values of
LN and V so that a link between evaluating mitigation alternatives and the expected cost
of fatalities can be established. If the social discount rate is taken into consideration, the
net present value of the cost of fatalities will be significantly lower than LN V . When the
social discount rate is set to be 5%, for example, the net present value of $100 is
approximately $29.53 if the payment will stochastically occur in 50 years. For a detailed
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discussion about social discount rate and the evaluation of human lives, see Boardman
[17] and Viscusi [27].
Let’s first assume V $500,000, and discount rate is zero, and consider the cases of
0LN , 2, 5, 10. The total loss of wealth can be expressed as AN ww  = LN V +$250,000.
The computation of the optimal alternative is shown in Figure 4. Each alternative Ai
(i=1,2,3,4) can be depicted by a point in X-Y coordinates when X and Y axis denote cost
of alternative and the possibility of collapse respectively. For each value of LN , we can
find a line that satisfies (4) and intersects an alternative and that all other alternatives lie
on the left side of this line. Then, the alternative that intersects with the line is the optimal
solution. Consider the case of 0LN , for example. We have  = 000,250
1 according to
(4). If we draw a line that satisfies
dX
dY =
000,250
1 through A1, all of A2, A3 and A4 lie
on the left side of this line. Thus, A1 is the optimal alternative for 0LN , which means
that remaining status quo is the best choice if there will be no fatalities in future
earthquakes.
In this way, the optimal alternative for any value of LN can be computed. The results
are shown in Figure 5. The optimal alternative is A1 for 1,0LN ; A2 for 2LN ; and
A3 for 3LN .
If we use the cost of fatalities LN V as a variable, the optimal alternative is actually a
function of LN V . Let optA denotes the optimal alternative, we have
optA =
VN
VN
VN
A
A
A
L
L
L








$1,083,333if
333,083,1$$616,666if
666,616$if
3
2
1
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If the social discount rate is set to be 5%, for example, the optimal alternative will be,
optA =
VN
VN
VN
A
A
A
L
L
L








$3,668,550if
550,668,3$$2,088,249if
249,088,2$if
3
2
1
This can be expressed as Figure 6. The optimal retrofit alternative can be determined
for any value of social discount rate and LN V in this way.
In order to make a comparison between the outcomes of Smyth et al. [26] and ours,
we introduce the factor of time horizon. Briefly, time horizon NT indicates the time
period that the apartment building will last. Although the building may be expected to
last for 50 years if the area does not experience a severe earthquake, there may be an
interest in evaluating the attractiveness of the investment using shorter time horizons.
Other settings include social discount rate d 0.1, value of the building $250,000, and
the cost of fatalities LN V =$10 million.
The results of optimal alternatives over different time horizons are shown in Fig.7. By
comparing Fig. 7 with Table 2, it shows that our results are consistent with that of Smyth
et al. [26] in most cases except the case when time horizon is equal to five years. The
advantage of our approach is that the alternatives are compared with each other by means
of their efficiencies in the reduction of the risks.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Marginal analysis based on the philosophy of utilitarianism is widely applied to
achieve economic efficiency. Utilitarian philosophy suggests that decisions be made with
the ultimate objective of maximizing societal welfare. In this study, we propose a
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‘marginal’ approach for regulatory decision making under risk. This approach offers an
analysis of the best alternative that maximizes the ratio of marginal reduction of the risk
to the expenditure, which means that the reduction of the risk can be taken into
consideration within the context of CBA directly.
While this study makes a preliminary effort to link the results of economic analysis
with the framework of ALARP, it should be remembered that it has been conducted using
some assumptions, for example the assumptions of the regulator’s utility function over
public wealth and the regulator is payoff-maximized. These assumptions may be
debatable outside the field of economics.
Regulatory decision making is generally a process that many stakeholders are
involved. Although the regulator’s views can be decisive when there is a disagreement on
the issue of regulation, stakeholders’ opinions are never negligible, especially when
seriously consequence is possible. Actually, there are always discussions and negotiations
between the regulator and other stakeholders that may include the operators, regulation
advisors, scientists, and government policy maker, etc before a regulatory decision has
been made. Group decision making is a complex problem in that many individual, group
and contextual factors may take effect. If the interactions between stakeholders of
regulation are taken into consideration, the regulatory decision making turns out to be the
negotiation between stakeholders.
The costs and benefits of risk reduction are rarely distributed equally across all
communities exposed to hazards. Most cost benefit analyses concentrates on net costs
and net benefits so that perspectives of different stakeholders could not been taken into
account. Theoretically, this problem of equity is to some extent solvable by means of
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negotiation. In our future research regulatory decision making will be investigated as a
process of group decisions in which negotiation between stakeholders, brokering of
scientific knowledge, influence of power hierarchy is considered.
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Figure 1 Optimizing risks and benefits. The width of the triangle represents the possibility of risk
involves.
Figure 2 Optimal expenditure optC is the point where line F interacts with the curve )(C . With
optC , the utility is maximized and the risk is reduced most economically.
AN ww
a


a
Opt
OptC
)(C

C
G
A
B
B
BC
F
Tolerable only if risk reduction is
impracticable or if its cost is grossly
disproportionate to the benefit gained
INTOLERABLE RISK LEVEL
Risk cannot be justified
on any groundsIntolerable region
Broadly acceptable region
The ALARP region
NEGLIGIBLE RISK LEVEL
No need for
detailed working
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Figure 3 (a) OptC is acceptable only if Opt is smaller than the unacceptable risk level (most possibly
within the ALARP region) (b) If Opt is within the unacceptable risk region, an alternative with
expenditure C ( OptCC  ) which will lead to an acceptable value of risk is preferred.
Figure 4 Computation of the optimal alternative. Alternative A1 is optimal in case 1; A2 is optimal in
case 2; A3 is optimal in case 3 and 4.
Case 1: No fatality.
Case 2: NL=2.
Case 3: NL=5.
Case 4: NL=10.
°
0.09
A2
Cost of alternative
A1 °
°
°A3A4 0.01
$65
(in thousands of dollars)
$85$135
Case 1
0.03
Possibility of collapse
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
0.06
INTOLERABLE RISK LEVEL
The ALARP region
NEGLIGIBLE RISK LEVEL
Opt
Opt
(a) (b)
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Figure 5 Optimal retrofit alternative as one Figure 6 Optimal retrofit alternative as one
varies NL , given V=$500,000. varies NLV, given discount rate 5%.
1 2 3 4 5 6 10 25 50
Time horizon
Optimal Alternative
A2
A3
A1
·····
····
Figure 7 Optimal Alternatives.
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Number of
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ···
A1
Optimal Alternative
···
·······
0 1 2 3 4 5 ··· Cost of Fatalities
Optimal Alternative
(in million dollars)
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Table 1 Alternative options of retrofitting an apartment building (Smyth et al. (2003, 2004)).
Alternative Probability of Collapse* Mitigation Cost
A1 Status Quo (original)
A2 Braced
A3 Partial (shear wall)
A4 Full (shear wall)**
0.09
0.015
~0
~0
$0
$65,000
$85,000
$135,000
* Note that values in this column denote the probabilities of the building collapse during 50 years, not
annual probabilities of collapse.
** Compared with A3, A4 is obviously unnecessary in reducing the risk of collapse. This is because we are
considering only the extreme situation in which human lives are in danger. If the economic losses from
serious damage (not as serious as collapse) of the building are taken into consideration, A4 may be
attractive because it makes the building much more solid. We keep this option here in order to be
consistent with the original literature.
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TABLE 2 Expected Net Present Value (in
thousands of dollars) (Smyth et al. (2004)).
Time Horizon A2 A3 A4
1 -$49.3 -$58.8 -$113.4
2 -$35.8 -$40.7 -$94.8
3 -$24.3 -$25.1 -$78.9
4 -$14.3 -$11.7 -$65.2
5 -$5.8 -$0.3 -$53.5
6 $1.4 $9.5 -$43.5
10 $21.6 $36.7 -$15.8
25 $42.9 $65.4 $13.6
50 $45.2 $68.5 $16.8
